tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-163840532024-03-13T12:20:29.758-04:00Notes on PhilosophyOccasional remarks on philosophical and logic methods, notes, and tutorialsphilhelphttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00615035374413135905noreply@blogger.comBlogger8125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16384053.post-63322826475488911712012-10-11T12:06:00.001-04:002018-05-25T14:06:19.530-04:00Philosophical Attitudes in Arguments and Critical Comments<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
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One of the slightly liberating effects of a philosophy course is to encourage freedom from the emotional tyranny of words. In philosophical discourse, words like "criticism" and "<a href="http://philosophy.lander.edu/logic/structure.html" target="_blank">argument</a>" are assumed to be used in an "emotively neutral" fashion. Emotively neutral language use is neither positively nor negatively slanted and is selected to avoid invoking emotion which might distract from the issues being analyzed.<br />
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In particular, the words, “argument” and “criticism” and their ilk, as used in the profession are not intended to be taken as terms of disapproval incurring emotional negativity. The everyday practice of not taking personal offense from someone’s personal <a href="http://philosophy.lander.edu/logic/disagree.html">disagreement with your beliefs</a> is sometimes an ideal difficult to maintain, even for writers or teachers of philosophy habituated to relative emotional neutrality when constructing and discussion interpretation and theory.<br />
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Many beginning philosophy students, however, consider the criticism of another person's ideas, and the receptions of criticism of their ideas from detractors to be impolite and oafish. Pointing out an inconsistency in reasoning is seen, by and large, as an <a href="http://philosophy.lander.edu/logic/person.html">ad hominem</a> attack on the character of the advocate. On such occasions, an exchange of ideas can quickly deteriorate into a personal quarrel.<br />
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Nonetheless, an objective of doing philosophy well is the mastery of "translating" emotively laden language into emotionally neutral terms in order to evaluate the logic of critical remarks and, consequently, couching our arguments in neutral language. An example of how we can stray from neutral language was illustrated by Bertrand Russell when he indicated how the same behavioral characteristic of an individual who consistently maintains an idea can be viewed from dissimilar points of view, depending upon the individual being discussed:
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I am firm; you are obstinate; he is a pigheaded fool. [Quoted in Irving M. Copi and Carl Cohen, <i>Introduction to Logic</i> (New York: Macmillan, 1994), 98.]</blockquote>
As another example taken as best I can remember from Thomas S. Vernon and Lowell A. Nissen, consider the state of little Mary’s room as described by three different persons:
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<blockquote>
The belongings in little Mary’s room were strewn about in gay profusion; little Mary’s room is untidy; Little Mary’s room is a pigsty. [Thomas S. Vernon and Lowell A. Nissen, <i>Reflective Thinking</i>: The Fundamentals of Logic (Kendall Hunt, 1976).]</blockquote>
As is evident in these “conjugations,” the transition of these statements progresses increasingly negative, but the contextual literal significance or logical import of the statements attributes virtually the same characteristic of “a person whose ideas have not changed.”
The intention, then, of philosophical argumentation is to dispassionately seek truth by stripping the emotive slanting of the expression of ideas in order to evaluate them neutrally -- in a word, to take philosophical disagreements as the rational exchange of ideas. If, in a philosophical discussion, it turns out that we are mistaken in our reasoning, we might learn; if it turns out we are not mistaken, we might teach; if the disagreement is left problematic, we might achieve an open mind.<br />
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For practical examples of dealing with criticism in philosophy and everyday life, enjoy Leo Babauta's discerning short essay on <a href="http://zenhabits.net/how-to-accept-criticism-with-grace-and-appreciation/">"How to Accept Criticism with Grace and Appreciation"</a>: on his <i>zenhabits</i> Website.<br />
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Also, for practice of working with emotive significance, the two exercises in the tutorial <a href="http://philosophy.lander.edu/logic/emotive.html">“Emotive Significance”</a> might be found to be entertaining.
philhelphttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00615035374413135905noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16384053.post-60085161094626802342008-06-24T11:14:00.005-04:002010-06-24T11:57:28.996-04:00Philosophy Position Papers<p>A significant proportion of introductory philosophy students have difficulty in understanding what makes a good philosophy paper. I like to require position papers--i.e., a paper providing the student’s reasoning or insights concerning a fairly precise assigned problem. Nevertheless, often position papers do not fare well in my introductory classes.</p> <br /><p>There are a number of excellent writing guides on the Web, and while I think these guides have some recommendations in common, for the most part the guides share a family relation of suggestions, depending upon the emphases of the course and instructor. Even so, I've found these guides only useful for upper-division classes.</p> <p>In introductory courses, most students have difficulty understanding the nature of a philosophical problem, and, of those who do get it, many are baffled not only as to how to go about seeking possible solutions but also as to what to comment upon the selected topic. This is not surprising since the discipline of philosophy, as I see it, is concerned with problems which have no clear or established method of solution. To the beginning student, the confusion as to how to proceed is precisely what makes the project frustrating.</p> <p>It seems to me one way some of the awkwardness of learning to do philosophy could be avoided if the instructor presented the beginning student with specific logically opposed quotations from different philosophers with respect to problems studied in the course.</p> <p>In this manner, the focus of the assignment would be student’s attempt to clarify and to argue for a best solution to the opposing views where the student does not just defend one of the two views presented. The presented task is not intended just to resolve opposing viewpoints or opposing doctrines by choosing one over the other. For example, if a topic were based on reading James and Russell on truth, the paper should not be an attempt to defend one theory over the other.</p> <p>The burden is on the instructor to construct a list of opposed views of a philosophical positions represented in short quotations or excerpts. For example, consider a passage where Lucretius argues that the soul is biological and a contrasting passage where Plotinus presupposing the soul is extra-natural.</p> <p>(1) First, Lucretius writes, "The nature of the mind and soul is bodily … [and] mortal. If the soul were immortal and made its way into our body at birth, why would we be unable to remember bygone times and retain no traces of previous actions? If the poser of the mind has been so completely changed that all remembrance of past things is lost, I regard that as not differing greatly from death; therefore you must admit that the soul which as before has perished and that which is now has been formed." (Lucretius, <span style="font-style: italic;">On the Nature of Things</span>, Bk. III.)</p> <p>(2) Plotinus, second, writes, "Many times it has happened. Lifted out of the body into myself; becoming external to all other things and self-encentered; beholding a marvelous beauty; then, more than ever, assured of community with the highest order; acquiring identity with the divine, stationing within It by having attained that activity; poised above whatever in the Intellectual is less than the Supreme: yet, there comes the moment of descent from intellection to reasoning, and after that sojourn in the divine I ask myself how it happens that I can now be descending, and how did the Soul ever enter into my body, the Soul which even within the body is the highest thing it as shown itself to be." (Plotinus, <span style="font-style: italic;">Enneads</span>, IV, 8. 1.)</p> <p>I think the interesting aspect with respect to posing fairly precise problems of this kind is the student has a wide range of responses and positions which might be taken.</p> ** <p>I'm reminded in this regard of Alexander Calandra's well-known <a href="http://philosophy.lander.edu/intro/introbook2.1/x874.html">“Barometer Story”</a> where a student constructs multiple surprising solutions to the problem of calculating the height of a building with the aid of a barometer.</p> <p>The burden for the instructor would be demanding in two respects: (1) the cataloging of specific passages from readings for such problem topics requires a good background in primary source readings, and (2) the evaluation of the paper on the basis of reasoning and insight (rather than the purported adequacy of solution along traditional lines) requires a open and charitable mind. Even so, I suspect position papers of this kind would offer much more opportunity for student excitement and interest.</p>philhelphttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00615035374413135905noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16384053.post-90411882245499785352008-01-26T10:23:00.000-05:002008-01-26T12:25:49.726-05:00Argument Analysis: Principle of Charity and Formal LogicRegrettably, on occasion individuals conversant with the methods of formal logic and philosophy venture into new subject areas immediately applying their analytical skills before seeking understanding of the concepts, precepts, or beliefs being adduced. Instead, the tacit and provisional application of the <a href="http://philosophy.lander.edu/intro/charity.shtml">principle of charity</a> should be implicit in every new intellectual and cultural endeavor.<br /><br />As an example, I'd like to recount the analysis of a passage from a computer science programming book brought to me by a former student of beginning logic. The passage is ...<br /><blockquote>Your computer, on the other hand, can understand only <span style="font-style: italic;">machine language</span>, a compact series of computer-readable instructions that make no sense to people. They make sense to some advanced computer gurus, but my general assertion stands that they don't make sense to people. (Greg Perry, <span style="font-style: italic;">Beginning Programming</span> (Indianapolis, Indiana: Sams, 2002), 14.)<br /></blockquote>The analysis and reconstruction skillfully provided by the student of this third-order <a href="http://philosophy.lander.edu/logic/enthy.html">enthymematic argument</a> was as follows:<br /><blockquote>No (people) are (individuals who understand machine language).<br />Some (advanced computer gurus) are (individual who understand machine language).<br />------------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />[Some (advanced computer gurus) are not (people).]<a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiAShSOvUrtGD_Sn5mGbF_r6rBb4qx3MqJSn1j8pMMizLYPQppTBLnryZAZFtOsHHJ5TDsgyPqBDGh9tAt2yO6bt7TezcL_ufOkXxTtgwZo-XfEXEieji0Pad59YqB8jsKjz9mUFQ/s1600-h/EIO-2.jpg"><img style="margin: 0pt 0pt 10px 10px; float: right; cursor: pointer;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiAShSOvUrtGD_Sn5mGbF_r6rBb4qx3MqJSn1j8pMMizLYPQppTBLnryZAZFtOsHHJ5TDsgyPqBDGh9tAt2yO6bt7TezcL_ufOkXxTtgwZo-XfEXEieji0Pad59YqB8jsKjz9mUFQ/s320/EIO-2.jpg" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5159836213214968546" border="0" /></a></blockquote>and the form of the argument, <span style="font-weight: bold;">EIO-2</span>, of course, tests valid:<a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiAShSOvUrtGD_Sn5mGbF_r6rBb4qx3MqJSn1j8pMMizLYPQppTBLnryZAZFtOsHHJ5TDsgyPqBDGh9tAt2yO6bt7TezcL_ufOkXxTtgwZo-XfEXEieji0Pad59YqB8jsKjz9mUFQ/s1600-h/EIO-2.jpg"></a><blockquote>No P is M.<br />Some S is M.<br />--------------<br />Some S is not P.</blockquote>Since the conclusion is obviously false, the implication is by <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reductio_ad_absurdum"><span style="font-style: italic;">reductio ad absurdum</span></a>, that at least one of the premises is false, namely the <span style="font-style: italic;">general</span> assertion that computer-readable instructions make no sense to people.<br /><br />The heart of the analysis depends on the <span style="font-style: italic;">logical</span> or <span style="font-style: italic;">precising</span> interpretation of the notion of "generalization" as something all inclusive and applying to each and every individual distributively.<br /><br />Certainly a charitable interpretation of the passage would indicate the author Greg Perry intended his "general assertions" to mean something like "Universally; with respect to all or nearly all ... As in A fact now g[enerally] received 1820." (William Little, et al. <span style="font-style: italic;">The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles</span> 3rd. ed. (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967), 783.)<br /><br />Of course, the student assumes that passage implies the author is asserting that computer-readable instructions make no sense <span style="font-style: italic;">to each and every</span> individual person, whereas the common-sense interpretation of the passage implies the author is asserting that computer-readable instructions make no sense to <span style="font-style: italic;">most</span> people.<br /><br />It's certainly arguable that the student's logical analysis results from not so much the lack of tolerance or charity as it is a case of the fallacy of <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Straw_man">straw man</a>, since the sense of the word "generally" to mean "almost all" is perhaps more common in everyday discourse than is the meaning "including each and every one without exception."philhelphttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00615035374413135905noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16384053.post-54158057850255224042007-12-23T12:05:00.001-05:002007-12-24T08:08:19.525-05:00Argument Analysis: From Casual Logic to Formal AnalysisAn article from Jan Korger and Florian Leber's <a href="http://www.spacezone.de/blog/pivot/entry.php?id=41&w=en"><span style="font-style: italic;">Spacezone</span></a> published on the Website <a style="font-style: italic;" href="http://www.linuxtoday.com/infrastructure/2007070202226OPDBSW">Linux Today</a> compares Ubuntu Linux with <span style="font-style: italic;">Microsoft (c) Windows</span> in the following argument:<br /><span style="font-weight: bold;"></span><blockquote><span style="font-weight: bold;">Ubuntu is not Linux. Linux is not Windows. Then, Ubuntu is ...</span><br /><br />Penguin Pete told us Ubuntu is not Linux in an infamous post he later deleted. An unrelated article tells you Linux is not Windows. Anyone bad enough at math will conclude a relationship between Ubuntu and Windows and secretly that’s the real subject of both articles...<br /><br />You can interpret this as Ubuntu is (like / similar to) Windows or Ubuntu is not Windows depending on your point of view if you're into such questions. However, this doesn't tell us whether Ubuntu is actually any good! (<a href="http://www.spacezone.de/blog/pivot/entry.php?id=41&w=en">www.spacezone.de</a>)<br /></blockquote>What I find interesting about this article is that the logic used, although not mistaken in an informal sense, illustrates several common confusions of many persons beginning their study of formal logic:<br /><blockquote>(1) expression in mathematics and logic are interchangeable,<br />(2) the <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity/">"is" of identity and the "is" of predication</a> are the same kind of thing, and<br />(3) reasoning using the principles of logic are a matter of opinion.</blockquote>In observing these student misconceptions, I am reminded here of Ernst Haeckel's generalization of the similarity of embryonic development of human beings to the evolutionary development of species: <a href="http://8e.devbio.com/article.php?id=219">ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny</a>. Ofttimes, in mastering a discipline such as logic, there seems to be a similarity of the stages of learning the discipline to the historical development of the subject.<br /><br />For example with regard to (1) the relation of mathematics to logic, historically Pythagoras, in his geometrical demonstrations, used logical reasoning, but it was Aristotle who later formalized and distinguished logical reasoning in the <span style="font-style: italic;">Organon</span> from geometrical arguments. (Of course, there is the similarity that syllogistic logic and geometrical reasoning are both deductive forms, but that is insufficient to imply the <a href="http://philosophy.lander.edu/intro/introbook2.1/c8751.html">logistic thesis</a>.)<br /><br />With respect to item (2), in the <a href="http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/sophist.html"><span style="font-style: italic;">Sophist</span></a>, Plato addressed Parminides' confusion of the "is" of predication:<br /><blockquote>Well, when we speak of a man we give him many additional names--we attribute to him colors and shapes and sizes and defects and good qualities, and in all these and countless other statements we say he is not merely a 'man' but also 'good' and any number of other things. And so with everything else. We take any given thing as one and yet speak of it as many and by many names.</blockquote>(Plato, <span style="font-style: italic;">Sophist</span>, trans. F.M. Cornford in <span style="font-style: italic;">Plato: Collected Dialogues</span>, ed.,Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (1969 rpt. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 251 a-b.<br /><br />And with <a href="http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/a/aristotle/physics/">Aristotle</a>, there was little confusion left:<br /><blockquote>...(1) an attribute is predicated of some subject, so that the subject to which 'being' is attributed will not be, as it is something different from 'being.' Something, therefore, which is not will be. Hence 'substance' will not be a predicate of anything else. For the subject cannot be a <span style="font-style: italic;">being</span>, unless 'being' means several things, in such a way that each <span style="font-style: italic;">is</span> something. But<span style="font-style: italic;"> ex hypothesi</span> 'being' means only one thing, </blockquote>(Aristotle, <span style="font-style: italic;">Physica</span> in <span style="font-style: italic;">The Basic Works of Aristotle</span>, ed. Richard McKeon (1970 rpt. New York: Random House, 1941), I,3 (186a35-186b1).<br /><br />The third misunderstanding, that logic is "the last refuge of a scoundrel" is reflected in the conclusion (of the quoted passage above):<br /><blockquote>You can interpret this as Ubuntu is (like / similar to) Windows or Ubuntu is not Window depending on your point of view if you're into such questions.</blockquote>The implication from these authors is that you can draw whatever conclusion you wish from the premises provided in accordance with your own opinions. In truth, however, no conclusion validity follows from a <a href="http://philosophy.lander.edu/logic/syll_terms.html">syllogistic argument</a> with<a href="http://philosophy.lander.edu/logic/exclusive_fall.html"> two negative premises</a>.<br /><br />Translating Korger and Leber's argument into standard form yields ...<span style="font-weight: bold;"></span><br /><blockquote>No [<span style="font-weight: bold;">M </span>Linux OSs] are [<span style="font-weight: bold;">P</span> OSs similar to Windows].<span style="font-weight: bold;"></span><br />No [<span style="font-weight: bold;">S</span> versions of Ubuntu] are [<span style="font-weight: bold;">M</span> Linux OSs].<br />------------------------------------------<span style="font-weight: bold;"></span><br />All [<span style="font-weight: bold;">S </span>versions of Ubnutu] are [<span style="font-weight: bold;">P</span> OSs similar to Windows].<br /> <span style="font-style: italic;">OR</span><span style="font-weight: bold;"></span><span style="font-style: italic;"><br /></span>No [<span style="font-weight: bold;">S</span> versions of Ubuntu] are [<span style="font-weight: bold;">P</span> OSs similar to Windows].</blockquote><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgrkLx2y_joU8LMT_pY_XRuRWuTFb_0woF5kBkkxwrRwk9ZI_oIYa7NNrcaXHsYUa8eSktSp479NgGJeJdPkT-KNje9HvitBor9JVM2ijl6eVlSdmvAiDBE5y4w4T1jpU9Vzna7yQ/s1600-h/ee.jpg"><img style="margin: 0pt 0pt 10px 10px; float: right; cursor: pointer;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgrkLx2y_joU8LMT_pY_XRuRWuTFb_0woF5kBkkxwrRwk9ZI_oIYa7NNrcaXHsYUa8eSktSp479NgGJeJdPkT-KNje9HvitBor9JVM2ijl6eVlSdmvAiDBE5y4w4T1jpU9Vzna7yQ/s320/ee.jpg" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5147334012251096386" border="0" /></a>The reason why no conclusion validly follows from two negative premises is negative statements exclude partly or wholly the subject class from the predicate class. So what is being asserted in in the premises relating <span style="font-weight: bold;">S</span> to <span style="font-weight: bold;">P</span> through <span style="font-weight: bold;">M</span> is being asserted regardless of the kind of statements being used.<br /><br /><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjVWn1RlpMe7ic1atypS24w5G9DXGsv0xsyKO_BNON_xDXbyE2nDJBLqyDldsKIcNcqoq9orAUmFCFsITAHJBhB13oSpPY6tmopmtirMIvxyWTRS0few8yCE23Vb6aDLmmYTOPnGw/s1600-h/mechanism.gif"><img style="margin: 0pt 0pt 10px 10px; float: right; cursor: pointer;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjVWn1RlpMe7ic1atypS24w5G9DXGsv0xsyKO_BNON_xDXbyE2nDJBLqyDldsKIcNcqoq9orAUmFCFsITAHJBhB13oSpPY6tmopmtirMIvxyWTRS0few8yCE23Vb6aDLmmYTOPnGw/s320/mechanism.gif" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5147321148824044834" border="0" /></a>By referring to the mnemonic of the mechanism of the syllogism sketched here, we can surmise that the basis of the syllogism is captured by noting that two things related to the same thing should be somehow related to each other, if at least one of them is completely related in some manner.<br /><br /><br /><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg_LaHC9Ox-IKqkJKNPF4BTpLsBKXDvV4GNZqM-1pAi64eCGa5tbHy-VZHFfVmIgqkCsbTASWfIp7Y-EEo-WMlj-tXd48FFP_2vBlgz1ZGClH_2e1-AzjlpxGKWWXdvsl_wu2tqFg/s1600-h/mechanism_exclusive.gif"><img style="margin: 0pt 0pt 10px 10px; float: right; cursor: pointer;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg_LaHC9Ox-IKqkJKNPF4BTpLsBKXDvV4GNZqM-1pAi64eCGa5tbHy-VZHFfVmIgqkCsbTASWfIp7Y-EEo-WMlj-tXd48FFP_2vBlgz1ZGClH_2e1-AzjlpxGKWWXdvsl_wu2tqFg/s320/mechanism_exclusive.gif" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5147321410817049906" border="0" /></a>However, when both premises are negative, our mnemonic shows the classes are not related in some way to each other, and this information is of no use to see how the terms in the conclusion are related. From the observation that two things are not related to a third thing, it's impossible to tell whether or not they would be related to each other. This state of affairs can be illustrated in the diagram to the right.<br /><br />So it's simply not true that we may conclude whatever we wish; in fact, whenever both premises of a syllogism show an exclusive relationship between the subject and predicate classes, no conclusion can be correctly drawn.<br /><span style="font-style: italic;"></span>philhelphttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00615035374413135905noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16384053.post-19604661299634739352007-09-29T12:58:00.000-04:002007-09-30T00:44:06.940-04:00Once Again, the Hemline TheoryThe occasion of longer hemlines in fashion houses together with the current mortgage crisis is described in the "Dashboard" section of <span style="font-style: italic;">Time</span> as follows:<br /><blockquote>Longer hemlines are showing up in fashion designs for spring 2008, indicating that U.S. economic woes could worsen. ... [T]he hemline theory has proved correct at times. Hemlines were short in the Roaring Twenties but fell before the 1929 stock-market crash. In the '60s miniskirts were <span style="font-style: italic;">en vogue</span>, and stocks rose. In the summer of 2006, designers showed short hems for spring, and in May the Standard & Poor's 500 Index hit a seven-year high.</blockquote> ("Hemline Theory," <span style="font-style: italic;">Time</span> 170 No. 13 (24 September 2007), 19.)<br /><br />Unless some kind of causal mechanism is hypothesized and tested, several observations of similar conjunctions of events are insufficient evidence for prediction of future connections.<br /><br />Normally, one would simply label a prediction based on the theory that shorter hemlines are a causal predictor of a better economy and longer hemlines are causally related to a poorer economy (as reflected in the performance of the U.S. stock market), as a case of the fallacy of <a href="http://philosophy.lander.edu/logic/cause.html%5D">false cause</a> or <span style="font-style: italic;">non causa pro causa</span>. In particular, as stated in the <span style="font-style: italic;">Time</span> excerpt above, the fallacy would seem to be the more specific <span style="font-style: italic;">post hoc ergo propter hoc</span>--the fallacy of arguing that one kind of event was caused by another kind of event merely because the second kind occurred after the first kind of event.<br /><br />Yet, what is the precise distinction between an "accidental" constant conjunction of events and and an "empirically necessary" or causal connection between events? Supposing that there were no disconfirming instances of this observed conjunction, how many confirming instances of a change in hemlines and the relevant kinds of consequent stock market movement are sufficient to conclude that there is a causal connection between these kind of events?<br /><br />On the one hand, first and foremost, the problem of event-description is paramount. Just as it is arguable that the various instances of changes in hemlines are not similar enough to describe these various instances of these events as the same kind of events, so likewise it is arguable that the various instances of changes in the stock market are not similar enough to describe those kinds of events as the same kind of events. But notice how, with a bit of effort, we <span style="font-style: italic;">could </span>tailor our definitions to cover <span style="font-style: italic;">just</span> those cases of hemline change and <span style="font-style: italic;">just</span> those relevant stock market movements in such a way that there could be no logically-possible counterexamples. (For example, this is how Alexander Fleming in his famous paper described the discovery that penicillin is effective against penicillin-susceptible bacteria. If penicillin weren't so effective, then the bacteria would not have been penicillin-susceptible.)<br /><br />These kinds of uses of the heuristic of affirming consequential results in a general statement are a common practice for hypothesis-generation by research scientists. In the case of hemline theories, if we were able to define hemline lengths and stock market movement in such a manner that these events were empirically or logically necessarily connected, then we would presumably not have a viable testable theory. If a future event conforming to our definitions were somehow to unexpectedly disconfirm our theory because of an error in formulation, then we could always revise the theory to exclude that event. Whenever the revision becomes patently viciously circular, the so-called causal theory would, in all good conscience, have to be abandoned.<br /><br />On the other hand, presuming we could construct reasonably neutral definitions of our key terms of hemline lengths and stock market movements, then, of course, our first task would be to try to falsify the theory by using something like Mill's Methods.<br /><br />But, again, suppose we were to find there are no disconfirming instances? Does the fact that hemline lengths and stock market movements belong to different categories of events, as stated in ordinary language, permit us to conclude causal irrelevancy? Although there surely are specific reasons based on the entrenchment of past language use for assuming there is no causal or necessary connection, that, in itself, does not allow us to conclude that a fallacy has occurred solely on that account. After all, proposed new theories, by their very nature, are not grounded in the ordinary implications of the use of the words themselves.<br /><br />Assuming that we could select data to show there are no disconfirming instances, how then can we justify calling the hemline theory a case of <span style="font-style: italic;">post hoc ergo propter hoc</span>? The answer has to do with the burden of proof. If we claim an argument is fallacious, we have not thereby proved the conclusion false--we have only claimed the conclusion does not follow from the proposed premises. Therefore, the fallacy of false cause, in this case, is accurately noted, because no cogent or testable causal mechanism is proposed to account for the conjunction of events.<br /><br />This too-short analysis, of course, does not disprove the hemline theory from a statistical point of view. One can always theorize about the probabilities of coincidence. But that is a whole different subject.philhelphttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00615035374413135905noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16384053.post-66732114698493441252007-09-10T20:31:00.000-04:002007-09-11T07:22:43.439-04:00Validity and Soundness in a Modus Tollens: A Vital Difference<span style="font-style: italic;">Mother Teresa: Come Be My Light</span>, a book in which Teresa's letters and correspondence are presented by Brian Kolodiejchuk, has generated much interest in the spiritual life of one of the most remarkable women of the past century. From that book, David Van Biema of <span style="font-style: italic;">Time </span>quotes from a letter Teresa wrote in 1959:<br /><blockquote>What do I labour for? If there be not God--there can be no soul--if there is no Soul then Jesus--You also are not true.</blockquote>(David Van Biema, "Her Agony," <span style="font-style: italic;">Time</span> 170 No. 10 (3 September 2007): 40)<br /><br />Of course, this passage as a question and a series of hypothetical or conditional statements makes no assertion of deistic, agnostic, or atheistic belief. A conclusion could be entailed if the additional statement "Jesus is not true" (via <span style="font-style: italic;">modus tollens</span>) or "There be not God" (via <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modus_ponens"><span style="font-style: italic;">modus ponens</span></a>) were present. As neither of these latter statements are asserted, we cannot validly infer an expression of any definite belief.<br /><br />Nevertheless, a reader comments on the <span style="font-style: italic;">Time</span> article by supporting the view that a purportedly atheistic Teresa would be a far more courageous individual than a purportedly doubting Teresa:<br /><blockquote>. . . people point to Teresa's lack of feeling the presence of Jesus as proof of God's existence. These people note her courage in persevering despite severe doubts. If she had been even more courageous, she would have admitted she was an atheist. Helping the poor without a belief in a heavenly reward is one of the greatest aspects of secular humanism.</blockquote><br />(August Berkshire, "Inbox," <span style="font-style: italic;">Time</span> 170 No. 12 (17 September 2007): 8).<br /><br />Note that the structure of this argument (with an overly generous invocation of the <a href="http://philosophy.lander.edu/intro/charity.shtml">principle of charity</a>, neglect of the subjunctive tense, and the introduction of an inferred subconclusion), is <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modus_tollens"><span style="font-style: italic;">modus tollens</span></a>:<br /><br /><blockquote>If <span style="font-style: italic;">p</span> is true, then <span style="font-style: italic;">q</span> is true.<br /><span style="font-style: italic;">q</span> is not true.<br />Therefore, <span style="font-style: italic;">p</span> is not true.<br /><br />(Where <span style="font-style: italic;">p</span> represents something like "Teresa is more courageous than someone who has doubts," and <span style="font-style: italic;">q</span> represents "Teresa states she is an atheist.")</blockquote><br /><br />Since helping the poor without a belief in heavenly reward contextually implies such a person would be an atheist, and Teresa helped the poor with (presumably) having doubts about heaven--we have the vague appearance of a (valid) <span style="font-style: italic;">modus</span> <span style="font-style: italic;">tollens</span>.<br /><br />Well, of course, all <span style="font-style: italic;">modus tollens</span> arguments are valid. But since there is <span style="font-style: italic;">no</span> evidence adduced for the statement that she admits to being an agnostic, much less an atheist, by any interpretation or translation of <span style="font-style: italic;">p</span> and <span style="font-style: italic;">q</span>, we have at least one false premise.<br /><br />Consequently, even if we were to agree somehow to the questionable and murky translations, the argument in the <span style="font-style: italic;">Time</span> letter is unsound. The best that Mr. Berkshire can hope for in this excerpt printed in <span style="font-style: italic;">Time</span> is the assertion of a contrary-to-fact conditional statement.philhelphttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00615035374413135905noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16384053.post-1153999028025019332006-07-27T07:09:00.000-04:002006-07-27T08:35:46.083-04:00Tautology and Falsifiability in Political and Religious DiscourseWhen Bishop Katharine Schori, the presiding Bishop elect of the Episcopal Church, was asked by <i>Time</i> magazine's Jeff Chu as to whether, with respect to the issue of gay clergy, it would be appropriate for another gay biship to be elected. Bishop Schori replied:<br/><blockquote>Dioceses, when they are faithful, call the person who is best suited to lead them. I believe every diocese does the best job it's capable of in discerning who it is caling to leadership.<br/><br/>(Jeff Chu, "10 Questions for Katharine Jefferts Schori," <i>Time</i> 168 No. 3 (17 July 2006): 6.)<br/><br/></blockquote> Considering the first sentence, we can ask what if a diocese were to call a person to lead them who is <i>not</i> suited? The implication from Bishop Schori's statement would be that such a diocese would not be faithful:<br/><blockquote>[All] faithful dioceses are [dioceses] who call the person best suited to lead.<br/>No dioceses which are this one are [dioceses] who call the person best suited to lead.<br/>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------<br/>Therefore, no dioceses which are this one are faithful dioceses.</blockquote>As a AEE-2 syllogism, the argument tests valid by the <a href="http://philosophy.lander.edu/logic/syll_fall.html">rules for syllogistic inference</a>. Thus, the first statement is not falsifiable and is therefore tautological in that sense.<br/><br/>With respect to the second sentence, we can ask if it possible for a diocese to do a poor job in choosing a bishop. The implication from the passage quoted above is clearly all dioceses do the best job they can because, even if they did not do well, <i>given the special cirucmstances they are in, </i>even in times of failure, they did the best they could. If a diocese chooses well, then it would be difficult to claim that they did not do their best. If a diocese chooses poorly, then the implication is that they chose the best they could under the circumstances under which they had to choose. Again, the statement is not falsifiable, given the lack of <i>ceteribus paribus</i> conditions.<br/><br/>Interestingly enough, when we advise someone to do the best they can, our advice can, of course, be interpreted in such a tautological fashion. For example, even if a result were to be a total failure, the claim can always be made that the best that could be done was done--<i>considering</i> the special circumstances.<br/>philhelphttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00615035374413135905noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16384053.post-1153588695160956722006-07-22T13:06:00.000-04:002006-07-22T13:18:15.596-04:00Identity and Composition in GeneticsThe idea of survival of the fittest in evolutionary theory would seem to imply that identical organisms would not compete for survival. However, in nature, no two things can be identical since they would differ in space and time. The philosophical question is to what extent that difference makes a difference.<br /><br /> In the theories of physics and chemistry, electrons or specific elemental atoms are more or less interchangeable when each type of thing is considered within a specfic context of conditions.<br /><br /> The case in biology seems different because background conditions are not so easily subject to <span style="font-style: italic;">ceteris paribus </span>conditions. For example with biological entities, according to the idea of the survival of the fittest, identical organisms could not compete with each other since that would result in no advantage for survival, yet, in a recent issue of <span style="font-style: italic;">Nature Reviews: Genetics</span>, competition between genetically identical cells are discussed in the context of improving fitness of the organism:<br /><br /> Competition between genetically identical organisms is considered insignificant in evolutionary theory because it is presumed to have little selective consequence. We argue that competition between genetically identical cells could improve the fitness of a multicellular organism by directing fitter cells to the germ line or by eliminating unfit cells, and that cell-competition mechanisms have been conserved in multicellular organisms. We propose that competition between genetically identical or highly similar units could have similar selective advantages at higher organizational levels, such as societies. (Khare, 577)<br /><br /><br /> If this were true, then two problems need solution:<br /><br /> (1) If natural selection in biological evolutionary theory is that individual organisms with favorable traits are more likely to survive and reproduce, then it would seem to follow logically that identical organisms would have the same probability of survival and reproduction. However, if Khare and Shaulsky are correct that competition between genetically identical individuals have higher selective advantages, then the theory of natural selection would not be meaningful because it would not be falsifiable. Whichever individual survives, whether being alike or different from the others, would have, by definition, survivable (favorable traits). But if those traits were identical with those individuals who perish, then survivable traits would be identical to nonsurvivable traits. Even so, traditional evolutionary theory describes the orgins of organisms, not the origins and survival of differentiated cells within an organism . Fitness among genetically identical cells, it seems to me, should be discussed. at best, in an analogical sense with the fitness of organisms because of the inplicity different scales of phenomena described.<br /><br /> (2) There is no reason to presuppose that biological organization and change on various levels of phenomena (<span style="font-style: italic;">viz.</span> cellular, organism, and society) would be subject to the same rules of natural selection. Khare and Shaulsky argue, "[cell competition] has a selective advantage in increasing the overall fitness of the individual by increasing tissue and organ fitness" (Khare, 578). But fitness of cells and fitness or organisms are considerably different orders of phenomena.<br /><br /> Just as an all-star football team is normally not a better team than the league leader, so likewise individually fit cells do not necessarily produce the most fit of organisms. To make such a claim without a supporting a mechanism and theory is to commit the <a href="http://philosophy.lander.edu/scireas/composition.html">fallacy of compostion</a>. A cancer stem cell, on this view, would seem to confer a selective advantage to a cancer patient. The interrelationships among cells, organisms, and societies are not presently reducible to the same biological theory any more than cellular biology can explain both interpersonal and sociological problems of modern life.<br /><br /> In truth, of course, Khare and Shaulsky note "No two cells are identical" (Khare, 580) because "Although genetically identical cells have the same DNA sequence, they might differ in epigenetic modification, nutritional status, signaling proficiency, cell cycle position, and other factors that affect fitness." (Khare, 581).<br /><br /> If genetically identical cells differ in factors that affect fitness, then by definition these factors are selective advantages. Nonetheless, these factors could not be intrinsic to the genotype under the traditional interpretations of the terms "genotype" and "phenotype." Undoubtedly, these terms can no longer be used in a precise sense in current genetic discussions.<br /><br /> In any case, this realization reduces the claim that "competition between genetically identical cells could improve the fitness" of an organism to a tautological statement. Any such "competition" among cells would have to be based on phenotypic differences. We are left with the unenable position that fitness, in such cases, for the organism, could only be shown in a Lamarkian world.<br /><br /> In truth, Khare and Shaulsky are suggesting that competition among epigenetically different cells of the same organism might improve the fitness of an organism.<br /> __________________<br /> Khare, Anupama and Shaulsky, Gad. "First among equals: competition between genetically identical cells." Nature Reveiws: Genetics. (July 2006) 7 (7), 577-583.philhelphttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00615035374413135905noreply@blogger.com